幻觉主义意识理论的解释进路
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.64549/jtii.v1i5.105Keywords:
幻觉主义, 现象意识, 幻觉问题, 第一人称显然性, 认识论祛魅Abstract
本文考察当代幻觉主义如何由对特殊现象属性的否定，发展为解释现象意识为何显得存在的积极研究进路。文章从现象意识与通达意识的区分及意识困难问题出发，讨论丹尼特对内省证据的批评和弗兰克什对“幻觉问题”的界定，并比较注意图式理论、推理理论与卡默勒元笛卡尔主义分别对自我模型、现象属性归因和第一人称显然性的解释。本文认为，这些方案使幻觉主义获得了较强的解释力，并为意识研究提供了可继续发展的替代框架。不过，现象判断所得到自然主义解释，并不足够支撑相应现象属性不存在的证明；认识论祛魅的效力及其本体论范围，仍需要进一步论证。
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